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SYMPOSIUM: THE FUTURE OF LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT, PART V 
―BEIJING CONSENSUS‖ ANYONE? 
              John Ohnesorge* 
 
There are enough questions on the table to get us going, so I’ll focus on 
responding to some of them.  First, to an issue raised by Salil Mehra1 and 
Tom Ginsburg,2 I generally follow the approach taken by Trubek and San-
tos in The New Law and Economic Development.3  Their approach defines 
the field (―doctrine‖) of Law and Development to encompass the activities 
of legal assistance providers,4 as well as the ideas about law, and about de-
velopment economics, that animate their work.  There are different strate-
gies for studying the providers’ activities, and Terence Halliday and Bruce 
Carruthers’s research for their book, Bankrupt,5 provides an outstanding ex-
ample of the detailed sociological work some Law and Development scho-
lars undertake.  But the academic enterprise doesn’t really seem separable 
from the activities of the providers.  We could discuss the pros and cons of 
that dependence, but I do not think we can avoid it.  The institutional play-
ers in the field rise and fall in importance over time, the ideologies concern-
ing law and economics that animate their work change over time, the 
external environment affecting the institutions changes over time, and this 
complex, dynamic stew provides the academic core of Law and Develop-
ment.  The academic field is not merely the sum of the projects, as Tamana-
ha appears set to argue, but is instead the study of those projects in their 
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poses for the scholar is that he or she must first figure out a level of en-
gagement with the institutional players that will allow the scholar to under-
stand what is actually going on inside them, and in their relations with 
national governments, while leaving the scholar free to provide serious aca-
demic analysis and critique.  I sometimes joke that Law and Development is 
a field where those who know don’t talk, and those who talk don’t know, 
but it is actually a serious problem for a scholarly field. 
A second response I have to Salil’s post is that LLSV6 and the Interna-
tional Competition Network (ICN)7 provide two great examples of why 
claims about law and economic development put forth by academics or 
provider organizations ought to be evaluated in light of actual episodes of 
successful economic development.  The episodes I have studied occurred, in 
large part, in Northeast Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and now China) 
during the 1960s, 1970s, and into the 1980s.  I think most observers would 
agree that corporate law during those episodes did not fare very well by 
LLSV criteria, and that competition law, likewise, did not exactly succeed 
in enforcing ―competition cultures‖ in those economies.8  Both minority 
shareholder protections and competition law have become more important 
in Northeast Asia in recent years, but this is coming long after the periods 
of rapid economic growth have ended.  Rather than searching in a more 
context-sensitive way for different tools that might work to invigorate a 
competition culture in different national settings, as Fox advocates, I think 
the Northeast Asian experience demands that we take the Law and Devel-
opment inquiry back a level, to ask ourselves what exactly it is we think de-
veloping countries need from corporate or competition law.  Doing this 
forces us to ask whether we are working on goals for them or for us.  Are 
we interested in minority shareholder rights in South Korea because we ac-
tually believe, in the face of Korea’s own experience, that minority share-
holder rights are important in a developing economy, or are we just trying 
to make the world safe for our institutional investors, to help us diversify 
our portfolios?  Of course, it is possible that what is good for us is also good 
for South Koreans, but we should not simply assume so.  Northeast Asia’s 
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of bruising battles with the United States and Europe over the way those 
countries implemented trade, investment, intellectual property, and compe-
tition policies, which ought to suggest that our prevailing Law and Devel-
opment common sense may radically overstate the importance of these 
areas of law for developing countries.   
Turning to Tom’s second question, the fact that so few of us want to 
use history to examine critically our assumptions about law’s relationship to 
economic development suggests that we have not learned enough about 
Law and Development since the advances made in the 1960s.  Even today, 
many of us still seem, explicitly or implicitly, to believe in the inherent 
goodness of law and legal institutions, that law is a seamless web, so that 
economic reforms will necessarily spill over into political reforms, and that 
our societies have something called the Rule of Law that we could export to 
practically any society, given sufficient time and resources.  Why do we be-
lieve these things?  Perhaps a better question is whether it would be possi-
ble to engage in the work of Law and Development without believing in at 
least a weak version of these oft-criticized propositions. 
As to the future, I think that just as the Asian financial crisis of the 
1990s worked to delegitimize the idea of an Asian development model,9 the 
fact that blame for the global financial crisis is being pinned largely on the 
United States will encourage renewed interest in alternative styles of capi-
talism—and will make it harder to sell legal reform packages that are ob-
viously derived from U.S. models.  Whether this reaction will be a good 
thing overall will depend upon one’s fundamental political values, because 
the oft-criticized political nature of Law and Development projects10 means 
that basic political values will also be implicated in any shift away from a 






  See Ajit Singh, “Asian Capitalism” and the Financial Crisis, in GLOBAL INSTABILITY: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WORLD ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 9 (Jonathan Michie & John Grieve Smith 
eds., 1999).  
10
  See, e.g., JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN 
LATIN AMERICA (1980). 
11
   ―Beijing Consensus‖ was coined to suggest that China today offers a coherent, positive model of 
development able to serve as an alternative to the ―Washington Consensus.‖  JOSHUA COOPER RAMO, 
THE BEIJING CONSENSUS: NOTES ON THE NEW PHYSICS OF CHINESE POWER 3–4 (2004), available at 
http://joshuaramo.com/_files/pdf/The-Beijing-Consensus.pdf (link). 
104:257 (2010) Future of Law & Development, Part V 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/3/ 260 
DISPLACING ―DEVELOPMENT‖: THE NEW AGENDA FOR RULE OF LAW 
ASSISTANCE 
           Veronica L. Taylor** 
 
I find Brian Tamanaha’s differentiation of Law and Development and 
legal development12 both helpful and persuasive.  I wonder, however, 
whether we should rigorously rethink offering ―Law and Development‖ as 
the defining name for an academic field.  The problem of causality and di-
rection in coupling ―law‖ and ―development‖ has been exhaustively de-
bated, so we will leave that to one side.  Let me give three suggestions why 
new dimensions of rule of law seem to map outside ―Law and Develop-
ment‖ and displace it as a meaningful field marker.13 
The first cleavage between ―law‖ and ―development‖ is in the financial 
flows directed at the militarization of rule of law.  Colonial powers and 
twentieth-century invaders frequently used the military to organize and de-
liver both military and civilian justice.14  The twenty-first-century version of 
this military ―standing-up‖ of legal institutions can be seen in the police 
forces, prison systems, prosecution services, and courts in places such as 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Timor Leste, the Solomon Islands, and Somalia.  More 
controversial is the way in which U.S. and allied Provisional Reconstruc-
tion Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and Iraq confer with local leaders and 
communities about justice issues or offer resources.  On one view, these 
short-term military tasks are distinguishable from long-term ―developmen-
tal‖ tasks such as clarifying property rights, regulating the finance system, 
or educating the next generation of legal professionals.  On another view, 
however, they create confusion in conflict zones because they seem to dup-
licate activities that would usually be led by civilian development special-
ists, while not being coordinated with civilian-law reforms that proceed in 
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and Somalia, this short-run militarized rule-of-law programming looks 
more and more like a permanent rule-of-law modality. 
Second, rule-of-law assistance continues apace for non-development 
reasons, reasons that are diplomatic, commercial, cultural, and military.16  
The last decade of Asia-focused legal reform projects sponsored by the Jap-
anese government, for example, included assisting Vietnam and Cambodia 
with Code-drafting and establishing Japanese law centers at universities in 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Uzbekistan, and Mongolia.17  Although these endea-
vors are worthwhile and also advance Japan’s national profile in these re-
gions, they are only related to ―development‖ (however defined) in a fairly 
tenuous way.18 
Third, rule-of-law assistance is now completely intertwined with the 
projection onto target countries of post-industrial regulatory techniques that 
are themselves a technocratic export.  Those regulatory exports (for exam-
ple, South Carolina’s prison system to Afghanistan) frequently have little to 
do with the ―development‖ of the target country and quite often take a do-
mestic regulatory failure and spread it further.  Because law and regulation 
are service sector exports within a global industry, however, I am less san-
guine than Tamanaha about what would happen if the distorting effect of 
donor funding ceased tomorrow.19  Although the pace of implementation 
might be slow, I am not confident that locally responsive, indigenous legal 
development would simply rise up to fill the donor-driven rule-of-law va-
cuum. 
If there is an upside to the globalization of rule-of-law assistance, it 
may be its visibility, and, thus, its vulnerability to critique.  But increasing-
ly, I think, any critique offered must be grounded in more than a demonstra-
tion of developmental failure because, whatever the rhetoric, the 
implementation design in so many cases of rule-of-law assistance clearly 
betrays a military, commercial, or diplomatic agenda that has little to do 
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